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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN J. MURPHY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890429-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution of a 
controlled substance, to wit marijuana, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986), based 
upon a plea of guilty by defendant, conditioned upon defendant 
preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Is the trial court's factual finding that 
defendant's package was subjected to only a private search 
clearly erroneous? 
2. Is the trial court's factual finding that a private 
citizen voluntarily relinquished defendant's package to law 
enforcement clearly erroneous? 
3. Is the government constitutionally required to 
secure a search warrant prior to performing confirmatory chemical 
4. Did the trial court have a substantial basis from 
which to conclude that the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant for defendant's home was sufficient to support probable 
cause? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and constitutional provisions 
for a determination of this case are: 
1. Amendment IV, United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized, 
2. Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John J. Murphy, was charged by an 
information filed September 27, 1988, with distribution of a 
controlled substance, marijuana, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986), 
possession with intent to distribute, marijuana, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1986), 
possession of marijuana without a tax stamp affixed, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 57-19-106(2) 
(Supp. 1989), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 58-37(a)-5 (1986) 
(R. 2-4). Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the 
evidence (R. 41-2). Memorandum was submitted by both parties (R. 
45-85, 203-230). An evidentiary hearing was held on February 6, 
1989, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third 
Judicial District, State of Utah (R. 231). Defendant's motion to 
suppress was denied. On March 6, 1989, written "Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law" were entered (R. 246-49). Defendant 
subsequently entered a negotiated plea of guilty to Count I, 
distribution of marijuana, as a third degree felony, specifically 
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress (R. 293, 297). Based on the plea, Counts II, 
III and IV were dismissed without prejudice (R. 291, 297). The 
trial court and parties agreed that defendant's: 
Plea is conditional to preserve defendant's 
right to appeal of court's decision on his 
motion to suppress. If Court of Appeals 
reverses decision on above motion, State may 
re-file Cts. 2, 3, & 4. [sic] 
(R. 297). On June 19, 1989, defendant was sentenced to the 
statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison. The sentence was suspended and defendant placed on 
probation under specified terms and conditions, including serving 
fifteen days in jail and payment of $1000.00 in fines and 
surcharges. A Notice of Appeal was filed by defendant on July 3, 
1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 19, 1988, at approximately 9:00 a.m., 
defendant, John J. Murphy, entered the "Handle with Care" 
packaging store in Park City, Utah to express mail a package to 
California (R. 307 at 6; R. 308 at 11). L Lee Ford, the sole 
proprietor of the store, knew defendant from previous packaging 
transactions (R. 307 at 6). 
Defendant filled out a Federal. Express air bill for 
shipping and handed the package to Mr. Ford (R. 307 at 6-7). Mr. 
Ford followed his usual procedure of shaking the package to see 
if it was sufficiently packed by the customer (R. 307 at 7). 
Defendant's package rattled and Mr. Ford asked him if it 
contained anything breakable. Defendant replied that "it was 
just some dog bones he was sending to a friend's dog" (R. 307 at 
7-8). Mr. Ford proceeded to process the package for shipping, 
charging defendant the federal express rate and giving him a copy 
of the air bill (R. 307 at 9, 11). 
After defendant left the store, Mr. Ford went back to 
custom packaging some art work he had been working on when 
defendant entered (R. 307 at 8). Awhile later, Mr. Ford prepared 
to ship defendant's package. Because he was still concerned 
Two transcripts from separate cases were considered by the 
trial court in ruling on defendant's motion to suppress. Both 
have been included in the record on appeal. The transcript of 
the preliminary hearing in defendant's case has been designated 
on appeal as R.307; the transcript of the preliminary hearing in 
the factually related case of State v. Arne Glenn Anderson has 
been designated as R.308. Since the testimony of the witnesses 
was basically the same in both preliminary hearings, the State 
will refer only to the transcript of defendant's preliminary 
hearing except as otherwise necessary. 
about breakage due to the rattling in the package, Mr. Ford 
opened defendant's package to add more loose-fill for shipping 
(R. 307 at 8). Mr. Ford testified that he was not suspicious of 
either defendant or the package at the time he opened it but 
decided to help defendant avoid breakage because defendant was a 
2 
"nice guy" and frequented Ford's store (R. 307 at 16, 21-22). 
When Lee Ford opened the package he first saw the dog 
biscuits on top of some newspaper (R. 307 at 17). Some of the 
biscuits were broken and had fallen to the sides of the box under 
the paper (R. 307 at 17). Mr. Ford opened the newspaper 
packaging and immediately saw two packages containing what he 
recognized to be marijuana (R. 307 at 17-18). The marijuana was 
wrapped in clear zip-lock baggies and could be seen without 
unwrapping the baggies (R. 307 at 26-27). Mr. Ford left the 
package open (R. 307 at 31). 
After opening defendant's package, a second individual 
named Arne Glenn Anderson came into Ford's store to ship a 
package almost identical to defendant's (R. 307 at 20; R. 308 at 
6). Mr. Ford became suspicious of the second package both 
because of its similarity to defendant's and also due to the 
actions of Anderson (R. 308 at 6-7). After Anderson left the 
2 
Mr. Ford testified that he was not initially suspicious of 
defendant or his package. However, Detective Mary Ford testified 
Lee Ford told her that, from living in Northern California, he 
was aware that drug dealers often used dog bones as a scent cover 
for drugs and was suspicious (R. 307 at 42-43). It is unclear 
from the detective's testimony as to what point in time Lee Ford 
became suspicious, i.e., prior to opening the package or after 
opening it and seeing the dog bones on top of the newspapers. In 
any case, the trial court factually concluded that Lee Ford was 
suspicious but opened the package as a private citizen (R. 246-
47, Finding 3). 
store, Mr. Ford opened the second package and again found 
marijuana (R. 308 at 6-7). He then called the Park City Police 
to report both packages and their contents (R. 307 at 17-18). 
Within fifteen minutes, Detective Mary Ford, Park City 
Police Department, responded to Lee Ford's call (R. 307 at 8). 
Detective Ford is one of three detectives in the Park City Police 
Department and is also the wife of Lee Ford (R. 307 at 18). She 
took possession of the open packages from the store and got 
physical descriptions of the individuals involved (R. 307 at 31-
32). Based on this information, a search warrant was secured for 
defendant's home (R. 20-21, R. 307 at 54). 
Defendant's home was searched at approximately 5:28 
p.m. on September 20, 1989 (R. 24). The Federal Express air bill 
was found in defendant's kitchen. Marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia, as well as cash and records reflecting drug 
trafficking, were found throughout the home (R. 24-25, 246). 
Defendant was arrested driving to his home. At the time of the 
arrest, defendant's wife consented to a search of their vehicle. 
Additional marijuana was found (R. 248). 
In the trial court, defendant moved for the suppression 
of the package and its contents opened by Lee Ford, as well as 
the evidence found pursuant to warrant at his home and pursuant 
to consent in his vehicle (R. 41-42). Defendant submitted the 
matter to the court based on his memorandum and the transcripts 
of the preliminary hearings in defendant's and Arne Anderson's 
cases (see supra footnote 1). The trial court denied defendant's 
motion finding: 
1. That Lee Ford had not operated as an 
agent of the government in opening 
defendant's package; 
2. That other than his marital relation with 
Detective Ford, Lee Ford had no involvement 
with the Park City Police Department; 
3. That Lee Ford opened defendant's package 
as a private citizen; 
4. That defendant's home was searched 
pursuant to a valid warrant; 
5. That the items seized from defendant's 
home were in plain view once in the home; 
6. That defendant's wife had voluntarily 
consented to the search of their vehicle; 
and, that no evidence of coercion was 
presented. 
(R. 246-249). (For complete "Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law," see attached Appendix). 
In reaching its decision, the trial court considered 
the following evidence. During the eighteen months, Lee Ford had 
owned the "Handle with Care" packaging store, he had opened 
approximately fifty to one hundred packages for various reasons 
associated with their packaging (R. 307 at 25; R. 308 at 15). 
Approximately twelve of this number, were opened by Mr. Ford 
because he was suspicious of their contents (R. 307 at 26). 
Defendant's package and the Anderson package are included in this 
number. Of the twelve, on two other occasions from the two 
referred to here, Mr. Ford found drugs (R. 307 at 25). On the 
two previous occasions, Mr. Ford also turned over the packages to 
the Park City Police (R. 308 at 28-29). On the two previous 
occasions, the police were unable to identify the shippers. 
Because of this, the police rewrapped the packages and shipped 
them (R. 308 at 29). Mr. Ford asked the police on those 
occasions what he should do if the shippers called the store 
about the packages. The police instructed him on his response. 
The shippers never recontacted the store and were never otherwise 
apprehended (R. 308 at 29). 
The Park City Police Department and Detective Mary 
Ford, personally, never told Mr. Ford to continue opening 
packages, never complemented him on his actions nor otherwise 
encouraged his activities (R. 307 at 16; R. 308 at 24-25). Mr. 
Ford received no reward or payment from the police. Mr. Ford 
opened packages sent through his store for his own purposes, 
those being his concern over retaining his franchise license if 
he was found to have shipped drugs and his concern for liability 
if objects shipped were delivered brokei (R. 307 at 17, 23-24; R. 
308 at 18). The national guidelines given each independent owner 
of a "Handle with Care" store are that the individual owner is 
liable and directly responsible for any items shipped through 
their stores. The owners are instructed to open and inspect any 
package that rattles, makes noise or is suspicious (R, 308 at 25; 
R. 307 at 23-4). The national guidelines, however, recommend 
that the opening be done in the presence of the customer (R. 307 
at 23-4). Mr. Ford has generally not opened packages in the 
presence of the customers and has not notified the customers that 
the packages have been opened (R. 307 at 26). 
Mr. Ford has not received any training, formal or 
informal, as to what to look for in regards suspicious packages. 
His wife has not discussed his activities with him other than to 
tell him that, to deter drug shipments, he might consider posting 
a sign that packages may be inspected (R. 308 at 17-18). Both 
the police and Detective Ford told Mr. Ford that they could not 
advise or support his activities, that the decision of how to run 
his business was his alone (R. 307 at 23; 308 at 18). Mr. Ford 
was tired of the problem and just wished "people wouldn't [ship 
illegal items] because they're jeopardizing my business" (R. 308 
at 18). 
While defendant raised several issues below, his 
conditional plea expressly reserved only the appeal of the motion 
to suppress (R. 297). In this regard, defendant has challenged 
on appeal only the initial search of his package by Mr. Ford and 
the adequacy of the search warrant. No issue is raised as to the 
consent search of defendant's vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress in that the search of defendant's property was carried 
out by a private citizen who was not acting as a government 
operative. The police subsequently lawfully acquired defendant's 
property from the private citizen. No warrant was required for 
the seizure since the contraband was in plain view when 
voluntarily relinquished by the citizen. Any confirmatory 
chemical testing of the contraband was permissible as a 
reasonable consequence of the lawful seizure. 
The issuing magistrate, as well as the trial court, had 
a substantial basis from which to conclude that probable cause 
existed justifying the issuance of a search warrant of 
defendant's home. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PACKAGE WAS OPENED BY A PRIVATE 
CITIZEN, WHO WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT OF 
THE GOVERNMENT; AND, THEREFORE THE SEARCH 
INVOLVED NO CONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT. 
Defendant contends that when Lee Ford, the owner of the 
"Handle with Care" packaging store, opened defendant's package he 
acted "in concert" with the police such that the search should be 
viewed as a governmental search and subject to full 
constitutional protections (Br. of App. at 13). In support of 
his contention, defendant claims that a pattern of tacit 
encouragement by the police created an agency relationship with 
Ford, turning him into a government operative. In making this 
claim, defendant ignores both the uncontroverted facts 
established in the lower court and the caselaw of the Utah 
appellate courts. 
The applicable standard of review of a denial of a 
motion to suppress evidence is that an appellate court will not 
disturb the trial courts's factual evaluation unless its findings 
are clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). Accord State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). A trial court's finding will be viewed as clearly 
erroneous when it is "against the clear weight of the evidence" 
or if the appellate court reaches a "definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made," State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, this Court must sustain the 
trial court's factual findings unless those findings are against 
the clear weight of the evidence or otherwise clearly erroneous; 
but, may, as appropriate, review for error the lower court's 
legal conclusions based on those factual findings. State v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327. 
Additionally, the Utah appellate courts have 
consistently recognized that constitutional protections do not 
extend to private, nongovernmental searches. 
The fourth amendment guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures protects 
only against governmental actions and does 
not extend to the independent acts of private 
citizens. Thus, as was observed in Walter v. 
United States, the exclusionary rule has no 
application to evidence obtained from private 
citizens acting on their own initiative: '[A] 
wrongful search or seizure conducted by a 
private party does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment and ... such private wrongdoing 
does not deprive the government of the right 
to use evidence that it has acquired 
lawfully.' 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988). The burden of 
establishing any governmental involvement in a private search 
rests entirely upon the party objecting to the introduction of 
the evidence. Ici. at 1221. 
Each case must turn on its own facts. However, to 
establish an agency relationship, it must be shown that the 
government knew of the search prior to its occurrence and 
acquiesced in it; and, that the primary intent and purpose of the 
citizen in searching was to assist law enforcement. State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-22. Factors to be considered are: 
whether the police gave specific instructions regarding the 
search; whether the police exercised control over the search or 
the activities of the citizen; whether the police suspected 
criminal activity on the part of the defendant prior to the 
search; whether the citizen received any reward for the search; 
and whether the specific actions of the citizen were, for the 
most part, his own independent conduct or the substantial result 
of the prompting and encouraging of the police. Ici. at 1223. It 
is not sufficient to establish an agency relationship to merely 
to show that there was some antecedent conduct between the 
citizen and the police. Ld. at 1223. Nor, is it sufficient to 
show that the citizen had some general motive of aiding law 
enforcement, for: 
[I]t is every citizen's civic duty ro do what 
he can to aid in the control and prevention 
of criminal activity, and 'it is no part of 
the policy underlying the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens 
from aiding to the utmost of their ability in 
the apprehension of criminals.' 
United States v. Koeniq, 856 F.2d 843, 350 (7th Cir. 1988), 
quoting Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971). 
Rather, 
[A] defendant must prove some exercise of 
governmental power over the private entity, 
such that the private entity may be said to 
have acted on behalf of the government rather 
than for its own, private purposes. 
Mere knowledge of another's independent 
action does not produce vicarious 
responsibility absent some manifestation of 
consent and the ability to control. 
The social policies pursued by the government 
will often coincide with the social ideals of 
many private persons; the coincidence of 
these goals falls short of establishing that 
the private persons are controlled by the 
United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d at 849-50 (citations omitted). 
Here, based on the evidence presented in support of 
defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court factually found: 
7. Lee Ford had discovered controlled 
substances in two previous shipments that 
were shipped from the Packaging Store during 
the approximately eighteen months that Mr. 
Ford has operated that business. On those 
occasions, Mr. Ford turned the controlled 
substance over to the Park City Police 
Department. Mr. Ford was not encouraged or 
directed by the Park City Police Department 
regarding any future suspicious packages. 
8. Lee Ford received no money from any law 
enforcement agency for opening the package 
shipped by the defendant, and was not an 
agent of any law enforcement agency. 
9. Other than being married to Detective 
Ford, Lee Ford had no other involvement with 
the Park City Police Department except as set 
forth above. 
10. Mr. Ford, when he opened the defendant's 
package, did so as a private individual and 
not as an agent of the government. 
(R. 247; Complete "Findings of Fact" attached in Appendix). 
Defendant claims in dispute of these findings that an agency 
relationship did exist between Lee Ford and the police because 
Ford had opened packages on two prior occasions and found drugs 
which he turned over to the police, Ford is married to a 
detective and the police did not order Ford to stop opening 
packages. But, such facts, without some showing of control by 
the police or direct benefit to Lee Ford, are not sufficient to 
establish an agency relationship. The ultimate focus must be 
whether the private citizen acted primarily as an instrument of 
the state in conducting the search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. at 487; State v. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-22. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), a 
wife turned her husband's guns over to the police in the hope of 
clearing him of criminal charges. The United States Supreme 
Court held that such voluntary cooperation with the police did 
not constitute an agency relationship where the government 
neither exercised coercion or dominance over the wife. 
Similarly, where a Federal Express employee opened a package 
pursuant to a general corporate policy of inspecting any 
suspicious package, no agency relationship was found despite a 
history of cooperation between the employee, the carrier and law 
enforcement. United States v. Koenig, 356 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 
1988). Even where the citizen is a charged informant who traded 
information for a dismissal of his charges, no agency 
relationship was found where the police only knew generally of 
the informant's conduct, but had not given him any specific 
directions as to what to search or exercised any control over the 
search. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988). 
Indeed, the cases cited by defendant are factually 
supportable of the trial court's evaluation in this case. In 
People v. De Santis, 399 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. 1977), the New York 
Supreme Court concluded that no agency relationship existed where 
an airline ticket agent opened two suspicious bags and then 
processed the bags but contacted the police. No control over the 
search could be shown since the police were not even aware of the 
search occurring until after the intrusion was complete. 
Further, the court noted that a common carrier has a common law 
right to inspect goods presented for shipment. IcL. at 516. For 
similar reasons, no agency relationship was established where an 
airport manager entered a car parked illegally at the airport and 
opened bags and containers left in the car. Even though the 
manager was a county employee and responsible for security at the 
airport, the California state appellate court concluded that the 
manager was acting on behalf of the airport and not law 
enforcement at the time of the search. As such, the exclusionary 
rule was not applicable to "the large numbers of people employed 
by the federal, state and local governments in capacities 
entirely unrelated to any element of law enforcement," People v. 
Scott, 43 Cal.App.3d 723, 117 Cal.Rptr. 925, 927 (1974). On the 
other hand, where credit card agents, in a joint operation with 
police and in the police presence, searched defendant's vehicle 
for the sole purpose of finding evidence against him to use in 
criminal proceedings, the credit card agents acted as operatives 
of the government. Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 70 Cal.2d 97, 447 P.2d 967 (1968). But compare United 
States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980) (where no agency 
relationship was found when the police only stood by during a 
private vehicle repossession in case of any altercations but did 
not encourage or direct the repossession; held tacit approval is 
insufficient). See also LeFave, Search and Seizure, 2d ed. § 
1.8(b), "Private" Searches, at 181, n. 41-43 (1987). 
Defendant also cites State v. Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 574 
P.2d 1330 (1978) as supportive of his agency claim. In Boynton, 
an informant was actively recruited by law enforcement to secure 
information on drug activities. The informant was paid by the 
police for his information. Under such circumstances, the court 
concluded that an agency relationship existed. But, as noted by 
the Utah Supreme Court, Boynton is factually distinguishable 
where, as here, there is no evidence of active recruitment by the 
police. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1223, n. 27. Nor, have 
other courts found Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) 
to be factually controlling where the subject matter searched 
does not involve any first amendment considerations. United 
States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Here, there was no evidence presented to establish that 
the police recruited, encouraged or otherwise aided Lee Ford's 
search of defendant's package. Lee Ford, like any citizen, was 
concerned with cooperating with the police once drugs were found. 
There is no evidence that Ford searched defendant's package for 
any reason other than concern for his parsonal liability and 
potential loss of license should he be found to have facilitated 
the shipment of drugs. The fact that FDrd had searched and found 
drugs on two other occasions that the police were aware of and 
that the police had not ordered Ford to stop searching does not 
constitute sufficient indica of a pre-existing agency 
relationship. Defendant offered nothing to refute these facts 
other than speculation that Ford must have been an operative of 
the police because he is married to a dstective. As such, the 
trial court's findings that Lee Ford acted independently of the 
police and privately searched defendant's pac?<age were wholly 
appropriate and must be sustained on appeal. 
POINT II 
NO WARRANT IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE POLICE 
LAWFULLY RECEIVING AND SUBSEQUENTLY TESTING 
CONTRABAND VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED BY A 
PRIVATE CITIZEN. 
Defendant argues that even if Lee Ford did conduct a 
private search of defendant's package, the police were required 
to secure a warrant prior to receiving the package from Ford (Br. 
of App. at 15-17). Additionally, defendant claims a warrant was 
also required prior to the police performing confirmatory 
chemical testing of the lawfully seized substance (Br. of App. at 
17). Defendant's position, under the facts of this case, is not 
supportable. 
While Utah caselaw has not specifically addressed these 
3 issues, the United States Supreme Court has. In United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), a freight carrier had conducted 
a private search of a package, including opening a sealed 
container within the package, and had found a controlled 
substance. Carrier personnel then rewrapped the container and 
contacted federal drug agents. When the agents received the 
package from the private carrier, they reopened the sealed 
container without a warrant and field tested the substance, 
finding that it was cocaine. The United States Supreme Court 
held that both the warrantless seizure of the package and the 
field testing of its contents was permissible since it "did not 
3 
It should be noted that defendant has not cited any Utah 
caselaw or statutory authority in support of his postiton; nor, 
has defendant argued for any separate state anaylsis (Br. of App. 
at 15-17). Therefore, this Court should limit its constitutional 
anaylsis to that of the federal constitution. State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327-8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had 
not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct," 
Id. at 119-20. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the 
legal analysis of Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 
(1980), that law enforcement may lawfully acquire possession of 
materials voluntarily relinquished to the police as a result of 
private searches, irrespective of the permissibility or legal 
authorization of the private search. Accord State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988). While the Jacobsen Court 
characterized the voluntary relinquishment to the government of 
the privately searched materials as a "seizure" under the fourth 
amendment, other federal courts, including the Walter court, have 
concluded that legally no seizure occurs when materials are 
voluntarily turned over to the police by a private citizen. 
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 652-53, n. 4; Coolidge v. 
New hd:rtpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488-89 (1971); United States v. 
Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir.), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1034 
(1985); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976). 
But, whether characterized as a seizure or not, courts have 
consistently not required a warrant to be obtained prior to 
receiving the items. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); 
Jacobsen v. United States, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 
(1988). See also Lefave, Search and Seizure, 2d ed. § 1.8(b), at 
177 (1987). 
The point of analytical diversion in the federal courts 
has been with the permissible scope of the government's use of 
the lawfully acquired materials once in its possession. Does the 
government's subsequent use compromise any privacy or possessory 
interest of the defendant not previously compromised by the 
private search; and if so, is the infringement merely de minimis 
in light of the prior legitimate infringement? United States v. 
Jaoobsen, 466 U.S. at 125. Further, divergence is found in the 
courts' characterization of whether that subsequent use is or is 
not a search subject to constitutional restrictions. Walter v. 
United States, 447 U.S. at 653 (government's projection of film 
privately seized constituted a search); United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 (government's opening of sealed 
container previously opened by common carrier was not a search); 
United States v. Snowadski, 723 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied 469 U.S. 839 (1984) (government's reading of 
documents privately seized by co-worker did not constitute a 
search); State v. Dold, 44 Wash.App. 519, 722 P.2d 1353, 1356-57 
(1986) (government's reading of letter constituted a search but 
was constitutionally permissible since the government's search 
did not exceed the scope of the private search). See also 
Junker, "The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of 
Protection," 79 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 1105 (1989). 
However, when presented with the factual situation of 
the case at bar, a point of unanimity emerges. When, as here, a 
private citizen voluntarily relinquishes materials which are then 
in a condition to be plainly viewed, courts have consistently 
held that no search or seizure questions arise. Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. at 657; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
116, 118-19. See also Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 
465-71; LeFave, Search and Seizure, §1.3(b), at 182. In non-
plain view cases, initial fourth amendment considerations arise 
in the context of determining the reasonableness of the 
governmental search when compared to the private. But, no 
determination considering the scope of the search is relevant to 
a plain view relinquishment. For, 
Where a private party has revealed to the 
police information he has obtained during a 
private search or exposed the results of his 
search to plain view, no Fourth Amendment 
interest is implicated because the police 
have done no more than fail to avert their 
eyes. 
The private-search doctrine thus has much in 
common with the plain-view doctrine, which is 
'grounded on the proposition that once police 
are lawfully in a position to observe an item 
firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in 
that item is lost....' Illinpis v. Andreas, 
463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 130 (concurring opin., J. 
White) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Accord State 
v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), citing 
United States v. Jacobsen (no meaningful interference with any 
property interest occurs when evidence is seized in plain view). 
But whether the police legitimately become aware that a 
container contains contraband through a subsequent reasonable 
search, such as in Jacobsen, or because the contraband is 
delivered in plain view, such as here, the analysis thereafter is 
the same. May a lawfully acquired substance, which appears to be 
a controlled substance, be chemically tested without securing a 
search warrant? The Court in United States v. Jacobsen answered 
in the affirmative, stating: 
Congress has decided - and there is no 
question about its power to do so - to treat 
the interest in 'privately' possessing 
cocaine as illegitimate, thus governmental 
conduct that can reveal whether a substance 
is cocaine, and no other arguable 'private' 
fact, compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest. 
466 U.S. at 123. Further, where the "suspicious nature of the 
material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was 
in fact contraband . . . the 'seizure' [for testing] could, at 
most, have only a de minimis impact on any protected property 
interest," United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125. As such, 
confirmatory testing of lawfully seized evidence is "tacitly 
assumed to be a permissible incident of such acquisition," 
Junker, J. Crim. L. & C. at 1145. Accord State v. Hansen, 732 
P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) (police need not secure separate warrants to 
search individual containers located on property described in 
valid warrant). 
While isolated cases, such as United States v. Mulder, 
808 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1987), cited by defendant, have applied 
Jacobsen solely to field testing as opposed to chemical lab 
testing, such an analysis fails to properly evaluate the 
defendant's substantially compromised or even extinguished 
privacy and possessory interests by the prior private search and 
subsequent lawful governmental acquisition of the property. 
Mulder creates a narrow and artificial application of privacy 
interests unrecognized by other courts. Indeed, even the Ninth 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has only narrowingly applied its 
own holding. United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 473, n.l 
(9th Cir. 1988) (Mulder limited to private search cases where 
scope of governmental search exceeds private search). 
More analytically correct are the courts which have 
refused to artificially restrict common police usage of otherwise 
lawfully secured evidence. In United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 
811 (10th Cir. 1986), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed 
both Walter and Jacobsen and concluded that no warrant was 
necessary where a private search revealed firearms located in a 
suitcase and the police merely inspected the firearms for serial 
numbers. The court rejected Walter as being factually 
inapplicable because the firearms were in plain view when 
delivered to the police; therefore, any privacy interest had 
already been compromised by the private search. Further, the 
court found that since the police had lawfully acquired 
possession, there was no constitutional requirement that a 
warrant be obtained prior to either the field testing of the 
powder or subsequent ballistic testing. Id. at 815, and 817, n. 
6. Similarly, in State v. Gentry, 450 So.2d 773 (La. App. 5 Cir. 
1984), no warrant was required where a private search revealed a 
powdery substance which was then turned over to the government 
and subsequently chemically analyzed. Citing Walter and 
Jacobsen, the court concluded that "[o]nce the private search 
reveals the item the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
governmental use of the item as evidence," Ld. at 775. 
Overruling prior state caselaw, the Oregon Supreme Court en banc 
held: 
When there is probable cause to believe that 
a lawfully seized substance is a controlled 
substance, a chemical test, for the sole 
purpose of determining whether or not it is a 
controlled substance, is neither a 'search' 
nor a 'seizure' under [the state 
constitutional provision]. It is not a 
'search' if the purpose of the test of a 
lawfully seized item is to confirm the 
presence of whatever the police have probable 
cause to believe is present in that item. A 
test for such a limited purpose does not 
infringe any privacy interest protected by 
the Oregon Constitution. Likewise, a test 
for this limited purpose is not a 'seizure.' 
A 'seizure' occurs when there is a 
significant interference with a person's 
possessory or ownership interests in 
property. The seizure of an article by the 
police and the retention of it (even 
temporarily) is a significant intrusion into 
a person's possessory interest in that 
'effect.' However, once the item has been 
lawfully seized, the person's possessory 
interest in that property has been 
substantially reduced. The additional 
retention of the item, for the limited 
purpose of chemical analysis or testing, is 
not a substantial interference with that 
possessory interest. While it is true that 
the testing of the item may change a 
temporary interference with a small amount of 
the substance into a permanent deprivation, 
the amount destroyed by testing in most cases 
is so small that any effect on a person's 
property interest is de minimis. 
State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 729 P.2d 524, 530-31 (1986). In 
Owens, the police had seized, incident to arrest, the purse of 
the defendant. Inside the purse was a "small, transparent amber 
vial". The police seized the vial and sent it to the state crime 
lab for analysis. Several weeks later, the defendant was charged 
with possession. The court concluded it was unreasonable to 
require any warrant for such confirmatory chemical testing. 
Here, Lee Ford, as a private citizen, examined the full 
contents of defendant's package and could determine even from his 
observations that the package contained marijuana. He left the 
package open and the contents exposed. When the police took 
possession of the items, no further opening of the package or its 
contents was necessary to visually determine that the contents 
contained marijuana. Based on these observations, the police 
were able to obtain a search warrant foe defendant's home. 
Apparently, sometime thereafter, a confirmatory chemical test was 
performed by the state lab. Under these facts any privacy or 
possessory property rights infringement compromised by the 
testing was de minimis, where the police could visually determine 
that the contents contained marijuana at the time Lee Ford 
voluntarily turned the package over to them. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
FOR DEFENDANT'S HOME WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Defendant attempts to assert that the state standard 
for reviewing the sufficiency of affidavits issued in support of 
search warrants is a stricter standard than that of the federal 
(Br. of App. at 17-23). He does not assert that the language of 
the state constitutional provision is more demanding than the 
federal; but, claims that state caselaw has retained the 
Aguillar-Spinelli standard despite the Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983), "totality of the circumstances" test. The 
fallacy of defendant's argument lies in his misinterpretation 
that the two tests are mutually exclusive. Rather, as recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court in adopting the "totality of 
the circumstances" test, as well as the Utah appellate courts in 
embracing it, the sufficiency-reliability factors of Aguillar and 
4 
Spinelli are still appropriate for consideration but not for 
rigid application. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085 
(1984); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987). Indeed, 
the "totality of the circumstances" test is not a new test as 
much as a more proper application of prior caselaw. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, [543-4]. Under the totality of the 
circumstances, "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of 
knowledge" remain highly relevant, but not as entirely separate 
and independent rigid requirements. Instead, they are "closely 
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, 
practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to believe 
that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place," 
Id. at [543] 
Similarly, this Court has recognized that: 
Both the Utah Constitution, article I, 
section 14, and the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution require that 
issuance of search warrants be based upon 
'probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation.' Whether an affidavit for a 
search warrant meets the probable-cause 
standard is determined by the 'totality of 
the circumstances' analysis of Illinois v. 
Gates [cite omitted]. In a line of cases 
beginning with State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the Gates standard. Factors to be 
considered include, among others, the 
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge 
of confidential informants, and whether the 
judicial officer issuing the warrant reached 
a practical, common sense decision. State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). The weight 
accorded these factors may vary according to 
Aguillar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
the circumstances. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 
1203 (Utah 1984) . 
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App- 1988), 
cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (1989). Accord State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 
1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985). 
Further, in reviewing an affidavit, an appellate court 
is not to conduct a de novo proceeding, but review the affidavit 
to determine if, taken as a whole, there exists a substantial 
basis for the lower court's finding of probabLe cause. State v. 
Stromberg, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State 
v. Babbell, 7 70 P.2d at 991. In doing so, the reviewing court 
must afford great deference for preserving the integrity of the 
warrant and deferring to the trial court's ruling. I_d. ; State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129. 
Defendant claims that the affidavit alleges only two 
facts in support of probable cause; first, that defendant sent a 
package containing marijuana and secondly, that defendant lives 
at the address to be searched. Defendant also argues that the 
warrant is insufficient because it contains no proof of Lee 
Ford's veracity and reliability (Br. of App. at 22-23). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the affidavit is 
clearly sufficient. (Copy of Affidavit attached in Appendix.) 
When taken as a whole, the affidavit established that a named 
private citizen was personally handed a pre-wrapped package by 
defendant, whom the citizen knew by face and name from previous 
business transactions. The package was subsequently searched by 
the citizen who found it to contain dog bones and marijuana• The 
citizen voluntarily surrendered the package to the police. The 
citizen also supplied documentation containing defendant's name 
and telephone number, which documentation was filled out by 
defendant to ship the package. The police corroborated the 
information given by the named private citizen by personally 
observing the package and documentation. Further investigation 
revealed that the telephone number given by defendant was listed 
to a home identified, through another officer's personal 
knowledge, as being the home of defendant. The warrant was 
sought the day after defendant had delivered the package to the 
citizen for shipping. 
The warrant sought both the copy of the documentation 
which would evidence that defendant had in fact personally 
shipped the package and evidence of other controlled substances. 
Both items were logical extensions of defendant's activities in 
shipping the package of marijuana. That both items would be 
located at defendant's only know address, close in proximity to 
the shipping store, and consistent with the identifying 
information given to the shipper is also common sense. 
Each fact in the affidavit was personally observed and 
corroborated by law enforcement but for the initial statement of 
Lee Ford that it was defendant who presented the package for 
shipment. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102. However, 
contrary to defendant's assertion, a private citizen, as opposed 
to a confidential informant, is presumed to be truthful. State v. 
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied 
765 P.2d 12778 (Utah 1977). Nor, is the veracity of the average 
neighbor witness subject to rigid scrutiny. State v. Treadway, 
28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (1972). 
Defendant is really challenging the assumption of the 
lower court that it is logical and a common sense result that a 
drug shipper would have the documentation concerning shipping, as 
well as other substances shipped, in his home. Again, such a 
factual inference as been viewed as a natural corollary of 
probable cause. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 
(9th Cir.), cert, denied 441 U.S. 965 (1979). Certainty is not 
at issue; but, the reasonableness of the probability that the 
evidence will be at the location searched. State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d at 1101; State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1984). 
In judging probable cause issuing magistrates 
are not to be confined by niggardly 
limitations or by restrictions on the use of 
their common sense, and that their 
determination of probable cause should be 
paid great deference by reviewing courts. 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983), quoting 
Spinelli v. United States. 
Defendant also claims that the issuing magistrate 
granted even greater invasions of privacy by allowing for a no-
knock provision (Br. of App., Point IIIB, at 23). No cases are 
cited in support. This Court has previously concluded that 
where, as here, the items to be seized could be easily concealed 
or destroyed a no-knock provision is permissible. State v. 
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Additionally, entry 
was not in fact made under the provision. Instead, the police 
announced their presence, and when no one was home, emtered the 
nrpmiqpR i n t h e d a v l i c r h t h o u r s . 
announced their presence, and when no one was home, entered the 
premises in the day light hours. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
submits that the order of the trial court denying defendant's 
motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of January, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utnh 84017 
Telephone: (801) 3%-446R 
Attorney for P l a in t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTPICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUTfiTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW REGARDING DEFENDANT\S 
vs : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to suppress came on regularly for hearing before the 
Court on February 6, 1989, a t the hour of 1:30 p.m.; the State was representpd 
by Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and the defendant was present and 
represented by his a t torney, Loni F. DeLand. The Court having l is tened to the 
evidence presented, the Memorandums of the pa r t i e s , and the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now nekes i t s 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 19, 1988, defendant, John T. Murphy, entered The 
Packaging Store in Park City, Utah, which i s owned by Lee Ford, and requested 
tha t Mr. Ford ship a package by Federal Express. 
2. The defendant paid for the shipment, and received a Federal Express Air 
Bi l l /Receipt for the package. 
3 . Defendant then l e f t The Packaging Store and l a t e r Lee Ford opened the 
package, because he was suspicious as to i t s contents. Lee Ford had noticed 
tha t the packag? r a t t l ed when i t was brought in by the defendant, and the 
defendant 's explanation was that i t contained "dog bones". 
4. Upon opening the package, Lee Ford discovered that i t contained a green 
leafy substance, which he believed to be marijuana. 
5. Lee Ford contacted the Park City Police Department, and talked to his 
wife, Mary Ford, who i s a Detective. 
6. Mary Ford canp to The Packaging Store, and Lee Ford turned the package 
over to Detective Ford, and told her what had occurred. 
7. Lee Ford ted discovered controlled substances in two previous 
shipments that were shipped from The Packaging Store during the approximately 
eighteen months tha t Mr. Ford has operated that business. On those occasions, 
Mr. Ford turned the controlled substance over to the Park City Police 
Department. Mr. Ford was not encouraged or directed by the Park City Police 
Department regarding any future suspicious packages. 
8. Lee Ford received no money from any law enforcement agency for opening 
the package shipped by the defendant, and was not an agent of any law 
enforcement agency. 
9. Other than being married to Detective Ford, Lee Ford had no other 
involvement with the Park City Police Department except as se t forth above. 
10. Mr. Ford, when he opened the defendant 's package, did so as a pr ivate 
individual and not as an agent of the government. 
11 . Detective Ford removed the package to the Park City Police Department, 
where she and Detective P i r r ag l io attempted to locate the whereabouts of the 
defendant. 
12. On the rece ip t , a copy of which had been turned over to Detective Ford 
by Lee Ford, the defendant had placed his telephone number. Detectives 
P i r r ag l io and Ford checked the telephone number and discovered tha t i t was 
l i s t ed to the defendant's homa in Hoytsvil le, Utah, and verif ied tha t the 
defendant in fac t resided there . 
13. On September 20, 1988, a search warrant was obtained from the Third 
D i s t r i c t Court to search the defendant 's home in Hoytsville for the Federal 
Express Air Bil l /Receipt and controlled substances. 
14. The search warrant was executed on the premises on September 20, 1988, 
and the police recovered the Federal Express Air Bi l l /Receipt and marijuana, 
cash, drug paraphernalia, and records ref lec t ing drug t raff icking. 
15. The drug paraphernalia, cash, and records, re f lec t ing drug t raff icking 
were in plain view when thp search warrant was executed. 
16. Shortly a f te r the search warrant was executed, the defendant and his 
wife were stopped on the highway near thei r home, and the defendant was 
a r res ted . After the defendant 's a r r e s t , a search was conducted of the vehicle 
tha t the defendant was driving, and marijuana was recovered therefrom. The 
defendant's wife signed a Consent to Search form for the vehicle . Tha 
defendant claims consent was not freely obtained, but the defendant fai led 
to submit any evidence on tha t issue. 
Tha court having rade the foregoing Findings of Fact, now nnkes the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard to the contents of the 
package mailed a t The Packaging Store should be denied. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard to the Federal Express Air 
Bi l l /Receipt , marijuana, money, drug paraphernalia, and records re f lec t ing drug 
t raff icking a c t i v i t i e s , a l l of which were located a t thp defendant's residence, 
should be denied. 
3 . Defendant's Motion to Suppres the maariuana recovered from the search 
of the vehicle driven by the defendant should be denied. 
ML/, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED t h i s i J ^ y Of fl||tf, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cer t i fy that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, th i s ^Y^- day of 
February, t989, to Loni F. DeLand, at torney for defendant, a t 132 South 600 
East , Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84102. 
APPENDIX B 
In The THIRD DISTRICT Court 
In and for Summit County 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
Affidavit for Search Warrant 
Summit County Courthouse 
BEFORE Michael R. Murphy ^ 60 No, Main, Coalville, Utah 
JUDGE ' ADDRESS 
The undersigned being first duly sworn deposes and says 
That Affiant has reason to believe 
That ( ) on the per6on(s) of 
fcx) on the premises known as 9S5 South West H o y t s v i l l g Road - T r a i l e r House 
( ) in the vehicles) described as 
In the CSKxaSXXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx County of Summit, State of Utah, there is now certain 
propert> or evidence described as 
Marihuana and c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s and 
R e c e i p t / F e d e r a l Express A i r b i l l - Package Tracking No. 9189681561 
and that said property or evidence 
( 50 is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed 
( X) has been used as a means of committing a public offense 
( X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense 
( X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party 
to the illegal conduct . . . 
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime of D i s t r i b u t i o n of 
Controlled Substances 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are. Affiant is employed as 
a Detective for the Park City Police Department. On September 19, 1988, 
Park City Police Officer, Mary Ford, was contacted by Mr. Lee Ford, who 
is the owner of the Packaging Store, 750 Kearns Blvd.r Park City, Utah, 
who informed Officer Mary Ford that a package had been left with his 
store, which he believed contained Marijuana. Officer Mary Ford went 
to the Packaging Store, and talked to Lee Ford. Lee Ford said to Officer 
Mary Ford that a person, who was known to him as J. Murphy came to the 
Packaging Store the worning of September 19, 1988, and wanted to ship 
a package Federal Express. Mr. Ford said that he had shipped other 
packages for J. Murphy, and that is how he had become acquainted with 
him. Mr. Ford described J. Murphy as approximately 40 years of age, 
grey hair# a beard, and a birthmark on his left cheek. Lee Ford said 
that he shook the package which had been brought to him and it 
rattled, and he asked Mr. Murphy what was in it. Mr. Murphy replied 
that it was dog biscuits which were a present for his sister. Mr. 
Murphy filled out the Federal Express Airbill, and indicated that 
the sender was one J. Murry, and that it was being shipped to one 
Jim Frank in Salida, California. Mr. Lee Ford told Officer Mary 
Ford that after J. Murphy left the Packaging Store, that he opened 
the package to prepare it for shipment. Upon opening the package, 
Mr. Ford told Officer Ford that he observed a green leafy substance, 
which appeared to be marijuana, and at that point contacted Officer 
Ford. Following Officer Ford's arrival at the Packaging Store, 
she took possession of the package which had been brought in by 
J. Murphy, together with the Federal Express Airbill. The Federal 
Express Airbill and the package were then taken to the Park City 
Police Department and turned over to your affiant, Detective Pat 
Pirraglio. Detective Pirraglio knows a J. Murphy, who matches the 
description given by Lee Ford of the person who brought the package 
to the Packaging Store. The affiant has knowledge of the foregoing 
information, because he has talked personally with Officer Mary 
Ford regarding the incident. The affiant inspected the Federal 
Express Airbill, and the phone number for the shipper, is 801-336-
2043. The affiant has checked telephone number 801-336-2043 through 
U. S. West Communications in Salt Lake City, and has determined that 
that phone number is listed to one Etta Place, 985 South West 
Hoytsville Road, Coalville, Utah. On September 19, 1988, Detective 
Pirraglio talked to Lt. Louis Stevens of the Summit County Sheriff's 
Department to determine who lives at that address on Hoytsville 
Road. Lt. Stevens told the affiant that the address is next door 
to his home, and the person living there is a John Murphy. Lt. 
Stevens described the person he knew as John Murphy, and that 
description matched the description which Lee Ford had given for 
J. Murphy. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant is 
issued for the seizure of said items at any time day or night because 
there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered. 
It is further requested that the affiant executing the 
requested warrant not be required to give notice of affiant's 
authority or purpose because the property^s^ught^may^bequi^kly destroyed 
or disposed of. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 20th day of 
September, 1988. 
Michael R. Murphy, District Judge 
